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We investigate two issues about the subjective experience of one’s body: first, is the
experience of owning a full-body fundamentally different from the experience of owning a
body-part? Second, when I experience a bodily sensation, does it guarantee that I cannot
be wrong about whether it is me who feels it? To address these issues, we conducted a
series of experiments that combined the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the “body swap
illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected with a stereo camera
set on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand holding a
paintbrush to brush each other’s left hand. Through the HMD, the subject adopted the
experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP: the subject
watched either the experimenter’s hand from the adopted 1PP, and/or the subject’s own
hand from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP) in the opposite direction (180◦), or
the subject’s full body from the adopted 3PP (180◦, with or without face). The synchronous
full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many participants felt that “I was
brushing my own hand!” We found that (1) the sense of body-part ownership and the
sense of full-body ownership are not fundamentally different from each other; and (2) our
data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical view called the immunity
principle (IEM). We argue that it is possible for misrepresentation to occur in the subject’s
sense of “experiential ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is having this bodily
experience). We discuss these findings and conclude that not only the sense of body
ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership call for further interdisciplinary
studies.
Keywords: body ownership, experiential ownership, self-as-object, self-as-subject, self-touching illusion, pre-
reflective immunity, bodily self-consciousness
INTRODUCTION
Many daily experiences involve the sense of body ownership, which
concerns what it is like to feel this hand or body as mine. Walking
into a coffee shop, I quickly get a cup of cappuccino and take
a sip to enjoy the nice taste and aroma. I experience the hand
holding the cup as my hand, and I experience this particular
body that just walked in as my body. Although the sense of body
ownership has been studied by many groups in recent years, two
key issues are still to be addressed. First, what is the relationship
between the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-
body ownership? Is the latter fundamentally different from the
former? Or is the difference only a matter of degree? The second
issue concerns: who is undergoing the experiences that occur in
this particular body or body-part? By walking in and taking the
sip, I not only experience this hand and body as mine, but I also
have an implicit sense that I am the unique subject of those expe-
riences that involve my body or body parts. For instance, I have an
implicit sense that it is me who is experiencing the specific aroma
and taste of cappuccino, it is me who is having the tactile sensa-
tions of holding the coffee mug, and it is me who is experiencing
this particular body that just walked into the coffee shop. We will
call this the sense of experiential ownership. The issue that we
intend to investigate is: can one’s sense of experiential ownership
go wrong?
The sense of body ownership and the sense of experi-
ential ownership correspond to the philosophical distinction
between the sense of self-as-object and the sense of self-as-
subject (Wittgenstein, 1958; Shoemaker, 1968; Gallagher, 2012).
Wittgenstein once made a famous distinction between using the
first-person pronoun “I” as-object and using same term as-subject.
He says: “It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain
in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine,
when really it is my neighbor’s . . .On the other hand, there is no
question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To
ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical”
(1958, p. 67). The idea is that when one is conscious of oneself-as-
object, error is always possible. However, when one is conscious
of oneself-as-subject, a specific type of mistake is impossible.
Shoemaker (1968) has articulated this idea by explaining that we
are “immune to error through misidentification relative to the
first-person pronouns” (IEM). Focusing on the case of phenome-
nal state, IEM states that when I am aware of a phenomenal state
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through first-personal access, such as introspection, somatosen-
sation, proprioception, etc., I cannot be wrong about whether it is
I who feels it.
The characterization of self-as-object above fits well with
our current knowledge about body ownership. Researchers have
shown how misrepresentations may occur in one’s sense of body
ownership. This fits well with the view that “I”-as object and
consciousness of self-as-object can be mistaken. In the RHI,
watching a rubber hand being stroked synchronously with one’s
own unseen hand causes many subjects to feel as if the rubber
hand is their own hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005). Researchers have studied not only body-
part but also full-body illusions. In the full-body experiments
by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), many subjects experienced the
illusion that the virtual body was their own, and that they saw
themselves from outside the body (cf. Ehrsson, 2007 for a dif-
ferent set-up). In the body swap illusion, many subjects felt that
another person’s whole body became their own and reported that
“I was shaking hands with myself!” (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008,
p. 5). These experiments have been widely used as paradigms for
studying the sense of body ownership (Bertamini et al., 2011;
Rohde et al., 2011; Pfeiffer et al., 2013; Salomon et al., 2013; van
Doorn et al., 2014).
In light of these studies, the first issue can be stated as follows:
Is the sense of body ownership involved in full-body illusions fun-
damentally different from that involved in the body-part illusion?
Or is the difference only a matter of degree? On the one hand,
Blanke and Metzinger (2009) propose that the most basic sense
of self, i.e., what they call minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS),
is “experienced as a single feature, namely a coherent represen-
tation of the whole, spatially situated body—and not as multiple
representations of separate body parts” (p. 9). The key features of
MPS, including self-identification, self-location and first-person
perspective are not modulated during the RHI. So Blanke and
Metzinger believe that MPS can be illuminated only by investigat-
ing the sense of full-body ownership. This suggests that the sense
of full-body ownership is fundamentally distinct from the sense of
body-part ownership. On the other hand, Tsakiris (2010) focuses
primarily on the RHI and holds that “the necessary conditions
for the experience of ownership over a body-part seem to be the
same as the ones involved in the experience of ownership for full
bodies” (p. 710). Also, Petkova et al. (2011b) in an fMRI study
suggest that “the unitary experience of owning an entire body
is produced by neuronal populations that integrate multisensory
information across body segments” (p. 1118). These views lean
toward the position that there is no essential difference between
the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body own-
ership. We think that, in order to solve this issue, the body-part
and full-body illusions should not be treated separately. So in this
study we combine both types of illusions. We test the hypothesis
that the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body
ownership are not fundamentally distinct from each other. This
psychophysical hypothesis, if correct, may provide a useful guide
for investigating the relevant neural mechanisms.
In contrast to our current knowledge of body ownership, expe-
riential ownership is almost neglected by researchers. To clarify
the second issue, it will be very useful to distinguish between the
fact and the sense of experiential ownership. Consider the simple
example again. On the one hand, it is a fact that right now it is me,
not you, who is the subject of this particular experience. Call this
the fact of experiential ownership. This fact is objective because,
for every conscious experience we can ask “who is the subject of
that experience?” and there is a fact about it. On the other hand,
this fact is connected with a first-personal perspective: in taking
the sip, I have an implicit sense that it is me who is having this
experience. Call this the sense of experiential ownership. It is sub-
jective in that one can experience oneself as the subject simply by
experiencing phenomenal states; the former is a part of the latter.
We suggest that the sense of self-as-subject introduced above can
be captured by the sense of experiential ownership.
Now the second issue is: can misrepresentation occur in one’s
sense of experiential ownership? Can one’s sense of experiential
ownership misrepresent the relevant fact of experiential owner-
ship? Influenced by Wittgenstein and Shoemaker, most philoso-
phers believe that this is a purely conceptual or semantic issue,
and the answer is negative (Coliva, 2006; cf. also papers in Prosser
and Récanati, 2012).We are skeptical about this mainstream posi-
tion, and propose that the sense of experiential ownership is
open to empirical investigations. Our hypothesis is that, the fact
of experiential ownership can be misrepresented by the subject’s
sense of experiential ownership. Pace Wittgenstein, sometimes it
makes perfect sense to ask “are you sure it is you who is experienc-
ing so-and-so?” and that Shoemaker’s immunity principle (IEM),
or at least some versions of it, fails to hold.
To address these two issues and test our hypotheses, we con-
ducted a series of experiments that combined the rubber hand
illusion (RHI, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005) and the “body swap illusion” (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).
By manipulating the participant’s visual perspective and allowing
the participant to interact with the experimenter, many sub-
jects experienced what we call the “self-touching illusion”: the
subject felt that “I was brushing my own hand!” The subject
was touching someone and being touched at the same time, as
well as watching his/her own body in front of him/herself. This
subject-experimenter interaction makes the illusion quite differ-
ent from both the standard RHI and full-body illusions (FBI,
Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). As we will see below,
the self-touching experiments enabled us to compare the sense
of full-body ownership with the sense of body-part ownership.
Moreover, they created a situation wherein, subjectively, it was
not totally clear whether it was me or someone else who felt the
touch.
METHODS
MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS
In this study, we used a headmounted display (HMD, SonyHMZ-
T1) and a stereo camera (Sony HDR-TD20V). The skin conduc-
tance responses (SCR) were recorded with a Data Acquisition
Unit-MP35 (Biopac Systems, Inc. USA). For questionnaires, we
used a Likert scale from “strongly disagree” (−3) to “strongly
agree” (+3). The questionnaire statements are randomly dis-
tributed and can be divided into the following categories: body-
part ownership, full-body ownership, touch referral, agency,
self-touching illusion, experiential ownership, and double body
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Table 1 | The questionnaires consisting of 13 statements divided into
seven categories.
Category
Body-part
ownership
Q1. It felt as if the hand seen on the screen was my
hand
Touch fererral Q2. It seemed as if the touch I felt was on the hand
brushed by the paintbrush on te screen
Q11. It seemed as if the touch I felt was on the body in
front of me
Agency Q3. It felt as if I could control the hand holding the
paintbrush on the screen
Q8. It felt as if I could control the body in front of me
Full-body
ownership
Q6. It felt as if the body in front of me was mine.
Q7. It felt as if I was sitting in front of me
Self-touching
illusion
Q4. It felt as if I was brushing my own hand
Q5. The person whom I brushed was me, not
someone else
Experiential
ownership
Q9. It was me who felt being brushed, not someone
else
Q10. The person who felt being brushed was not me
Double body
effect
Q12. It felt as if I had two bodies
Q13. It felt as if I was looking at myself from the
opposite side
Statements in questionnaires. The questionnaires were in Chinese when pre-
sented to participants. Here are the English translations, and the wordings of
some statements were slightly adjusted to fit the different HMD images across
experiments. The questionnaires for the full-body conditions did not contain
body-part statements Q1–Q3.
effect (Table 1). We conducted three experiments, each with four
conditions. See Table 2 below for the details of the participants.
All participants gave written consent prior to the experiments.
This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
National Taiwan University (NTU-REC: 201310HS026).
PROCEDURE
The subject wore a HMD connected with a stereo camera posi-
tioned on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used
their right hand to hold a paintbrush to brush each other’s
left hand for 2min (Figure 1A). We call this set-up the “Basic
Setting.” The brushing was either synchronous or asynchronous.
In the asynchronous conditions, the subject was asked to main-
tain a constant speed of about 2 s per stroke, but the experimenter
varied the frequency randomly from 1 to 3 s per stroke. The exper-
imenter also randomly brushed different locations on the back
of the subject’s left hand, including the fingers and the wrist.
Through the HMD, the subject adopted the experimenter’s first
person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP. We will call
this adopted 1PP. The subject watched either the experimenter’s
hand from the adopted 1PP, and/or the subject’s own hand from
the experimenter’s third person perspective (hereafter, adopted
3PP, 180◦), or the subject’s full body from the adopted 3PP (180◦,
with or without face).
To measure SCR, two single-use foam electrodes (Covidien,
Inc., Mansfield, USA) were attached to the participant’s left-hand
middle finger and fourth finger, on the volar surfaces of the
medial phalanges. Data were registered at a sample rate of 200Hz,
and analyzed with Biopac software AcqKnowledge v. 3.7.7. In
Experiments 1 and 2, we presented a threat (kitchen knife) at the
90th second. The knife was shown in the scene and approached
the stereo camera (i.e., the subject’s adopted 1PP). We identified
the amplitude of SCR as the difference between the maximal and
minimal values of the responses within 5 s after the knife threat.
Thus, what we measured was phasic SCR (Dawson et al., 2007).
Those subjects who did not show any SCR amplitude were clas-
sified as non-responders, and were excluded from the analysis.
Totally, we excluded 4 pieces of SCR data. After each experiment,
the participant filled out a questionnaire.
Regarding statistical methods, based on many previous stud-
ies, we had strong prior expectations that the values measured in
the synchronous conditions would be higher than in the asyn-
chronous conditions, i.e., we assumed that μ1(synchronous) >
μ2(asynchronous). So in Experiments 1 and 2, we used one-
tailed t-tests to analyze both the questionnaires and SCR data.
Then, to compare the sense of body-part ownership and the sense
of full-body ownership, we conducted ANOVA and correlation
analyses across five conditions selected from Experiments 1∼3.
Finally, we did a correlation analysis on the data about the sense
of experiential ownership.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, the participant watched through the HMD the
front side of his/her own virtual body, including not only the
torso, legs, and face, but also his/her own right hand holding
a paintbrush (Figure 1B). This experiment had two goals. The
first was to verify whether this setting would create a variant of
the full-body illusion, which may provide a new paradigm for
studying full-body ownership. Second, we believe that in order to
investigate the sense of experiential ownership, the experimental
set-up should be arranged such that the subject may interact with
another person. In Petkova and Ehrsson (2008), the subject and
the experimenter squeezed each other’s hands synchronously and,
due to manipulation of visual perspective, some participants felt
that they were shaking hands with themselves. However, Petkova
and Ehrsson’s research target was exclusively on the sense of body
ownership. Like most studies, the sense of experiential ownership
was not measured. Therefore, in Experiment 1 we used the Basic
Setting to examine whether the subjective experience of “self-
touching” is a solid effect, and we investigated not only the sense
of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership.
In condition 1, we performed synchronous brushing followed by
a questionnaire. For the sake of later discussion, we will use “FB1”
(Full-body condition 1) to indicate this condition. In condition 2
the brushing was asynchronous. Using the same set-up, in condi-
tions 3 and 4 we measured SCR to provide objective support for
conditions 1 and 2 respectively (Table 2).
Experiment 2
In order to exclude the possibility that the phenomena measured
by Experiment 1 are merely isolated contingent effects, we
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Table 2 | Overview of experiments.
Experiment Description Measures taken Participants (n) Statistics
Experiment 1 Cond. 1: Sync. Full body, face, active hand Questionnaire (FB1) 38 ( ♂ 21)
M = 21.55 ± 2.90
t-test (Sync. Vs. Async)
Cond. 2: Async. Full body, face, active hand Questionnaire 35 ( ♂ 18)
M = 21.23 ± 1.66
Cond. 3: Sync. Full body, face, active hand SCR 15 ( ♂ 7)
M = 22.13 ± 3.14
t-test (Sync. Vs. Async)
Cond. 4: Async. Full body, face, active hand SCR 15 ( ♂ 6)
M = 22.47 ± 3.02
Experiment 2 Cond. 1: Sync. Full body, no face, passive hand Questionnaire (FB2) 28 ( ♂ 20)
M = 23.75 ± 3.63
t-test (Sync. Vs. Async)
Cond. 2: Async. Full body, no face, passive hand Questionnaire 14 ( ♂ 11)
M = 23.43 ± 3.80
Cond. 3: Sync. Full body, no face, passive hand SCR 13 ( ♂ 9)
M = 24.08 ± 3.52
t-test (Sync. Vs. Async)
Cond. 4: Async. Full body, no face, passive hand SCR 13 ( ♂ 10)
M = 23.69 ± 3.82
Experiment 3 Cond. 1: Sync. Full body, no face, no hand Questionnaire (FB3) 24 ( ♂ 15)
M = 21.50 ± 2.73
ANOVA
Cond. 2: Sync. Full body, no face, active hand Questionnaire (FB4) 27 ( ♂ 13)
M = 21.52 ± 3.33
ANOVA
Cond. 3: Sync. 1PP passive hand Questionnaire (BP1) 25 ( ♂ 10)
M = 21.48 ± 2.26
ANOVA
Cond. 4: Sync. 1PP passive hand & 3PP active hand Questionnaire (BP2) 27 ( ♂ 16)
M = 21.44 ± 2.69
ANOVA
applied the Basic Setting and constructed a different full-body
condition. In Experiment 2, the participant watched through
the HMD the front side of his/her own virtual body, including
the torso and legs, but not the face. The participant also saw
his/her own left hand being touched by a paintbrush held by the
experimenter’s hand (Figure 1C). This experiment consisted of
four conditions as well, and the procedures and measurements
were exactly the same as Experiment 1 (Table 2). The only
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 were the HMD images
described above. In Experiment 2, we will call condition 1 “FB2”
(Full-body condition 2).
Experiment 3
We used the Basic Setting to conduct two other full-body con-
ditions (FB3 and FB4) and two body-part conditions (BP1
and BP2). In this experiment, only the synchronous conditions
were performed and measured by questionnaires. FB3: Through
the HMD, the subject saw the front side of his/her own vir-
tual body from below the neck. The subject saw his/her own
torso, but not the face and hands (Figure 1D). FB4: Through
the HMD, the subject saw the front side of his/her own vir-
tual body, including not only the torso and legs, but also his/her
own right hand holding a paintbrush (Figure 1E). BP1: Through
the HMD, the subject saw the experimenter’s hand from the
adopted 1PP being touched by a paintbrush (Figure 1F). BP2:
The subject saw two hands via the HMD: the subject’s own
hand viewed from the adopted 3PP in the opposite direction
(180◦) holding a paintbrush and brushing the experimenter’s
hand. The experimenter’s hand was viewed from the adopted 1PP
(Figure 1G).
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
We report two key observations from Experiment 1. First, the
questionnaire contained statements regarding full-body own-
ership (Q6), self-location (Q7), full-body agency (Q8), and the
double body effect (Q12 and Q13). The average scores on these
statements were significantly higher in the synchronous condi-
tion (FB1) than in the asynchronous condition (Q6: p = 0.0073,
Cohen’s d = 0.594; Q7: p = 0.0021, Cohen’s d = 0.706; Q8:
p = 0.0012, Cohen’s d = 0.748; Q12: p = 0.0001, Cohen’s
d = 0.933; Q13: p = 0.0140, Cohen’s d = 0.533, independent
one-tailed t-test, Figure 2A). The SCR measured in conditions 3
and 4 showed the same differences as well (p = 0.0080, Cohen’s
d = 0.970, independent one-tailed t-test, Figure 2B), which
provided objective support for the questionnaire data. This
suggests that FB1 successfully induced a new version of the
full-body illusion, where the participants felt as if the body in
front of them was theirs (Q6) and that they could control it (Q8),
and they felt as if they were sitting in front of their own body
(Q7). These results are consistent with previous studies (Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Finally, they even felt as if they
had two bodies (Q12 and Q13, cf. Supplement Materials for more
discussion on this effect).
Second, compared with the asynchronous condition, the
synchronous full-body condition generated a “self-touching
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental set-up. (A) The Basic Setting. The participant
wore a HMD connected with a stereo camera positioned on the
experimenter’s head. They sat face to face to brush each other’s left hand
with a paintbrush held in their right hand. (B) illustrates what participants
saw through the HMD in Experiment 1. The participants saw the front side
of their virtual body from the adopted 3PP, including torso, legs, face, and
their right hand holding a paintbrush. The synchronous condition measured
by questionnaire will be called FB1. (C) illustrates what the participants saw
via the HMD in Experiment 2. The participants saw their own virtual torso,
legs, but not the face. They also saw their left hand being touched by a
paintbrush held by the experimenter’s hand, which was seen from the
adopted 1PP. The synchronous condition measured by questionnaire will be
called FB2. (D) FB3 in Experiment 3: through the HMD, the participants
saw the front side of their virtual body from below the neck sitting in front
of themselves. They saw their own torso, but not the face and hands. (E)
FB4 in Experiment 3: the participants saw not only the torso and legs, but
also their right hand holding a paintbrush. (F) BP1 in Experiment 3: the
subject saw the experimenter’s hand from 1PP being touched by a
paintbrush. (G) BP2 in Experiment 3: the subject saw his/her own hand
from the adopted 3PP in the opposite direction (180◦) holding a paintbrush
and brushing the experimenter’s hand. The experimenter’s hand was
viewed from the adopted 1PP.
illusion”: the subject felt that “I was brushing my own hand!”
This was measured by two questionnaire statements: “It felt as
if I was brushing my own hand” (Q4), and “The one whom
I brushed was me, not someone else” (Q5). Since Q4 and Q5
involve both hand-touching and self-identification (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009), they are associated not only with body-part
but also full-body representations. Statistics showed significant
FIGURE 2 | Results. (A) Questionnaire of Experiment 1. Participants
indicated their responses on a scale ranging from “strongly agree” (+3) to
“strongly disagree” (−3). There were significant differences between the
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. (B) Physiological evidence of
Experiment 1. SCR was measured when the subject’s adopted 1PP was
“threatened” with a knife. The SCR was significantly greater in the
synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition. (C)
Questionnaire of Experiment 2. In these statements there were significant
differences between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. (D)
Physiological evidence of Experiment 2. SCRwasmeasured in the sameway
as Experiment 1. The result was significantly greater in the synchronous
condition than in the asynchronous condition. (E) Questionnaire averages for
Q4∼Q8 in FB3 of Experiment 3. (F) Questionnaire averages for Q4∼Q8 in
FB4 of Experiment 3. (G) Questionnaire averages for Q1∼Q8 in BP1 of
Experiment 3. (H)Questionnaire averages forQ1∼Q8 inBP2of Experiment 3.
For details, see the Results Section. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
differences between the synchronous and asynchronous con-
ditions (Q4: p < 0.0010, Cohen’s d = 1.301; Q5: p < 0.0010,
Cohen’s d = 1.168, independent one-tailed t-test, Figure 2A),
and the SCR results provided objective evidence for this new
type of full-body illusion (Figure 2B). This supports that the
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self-touching illusion is a distinctive version of the full-body
illusion.
EXPERIMENT 2
Using the same questionnaire in Experiment 2, we found that the
average scores for full-body ownership (Q6), self-location (Q7),
full-body agency (Q8), and the double body effect (Q12 and Q13)
were significantly higher in the synchronous condition (FB2)
than in the asynchronous condition (Q6: p = 0.0023, Cohen’s
d = 1.009; Q7: p = 0.0457, Cohen’s d = 0.581; Q8: p < 0.0010,
Cohen’s d = 1.675; Q12: p = 0.0446, Cohen’s d = 0.585; Q13:
p = 0.0171, Cohen’s d = 0.735, independent one-tailed t-test,
Figure 2C). Also, the SCR values were significantly higher in
the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition
(p = 0.0473, Cohen’s d = 0.711, independent one-tailed t-test,
Figure 2D). This indicates that, like FB1 above, FB2 can induce
a version of full-body illusion as well. These results nicely collab-
orate with the data collected from Experiment 1, suggesting that
there are in fact many ways to induce full-body illusions.
Second, just like Experiment 1, the synchronous condition
in Experiment 2, i.e., FB2, caused the subject to experience the
self-touching illusion: the participants felt as if they were brush-
ing their own hand. We observed significant differences between
the synchronous and asynchronous conditions on Q4 and Q5
(Q4: p < 0.0010, Cohen’s d = 1.821; Q5: p = 0.0003, Cohen’s
d = 1.236, independent one-tailed t-test, Figure 2C) and on the
SCR values (Figure 2D). The data for the sense of experiential
ownership will be presented later. Together with the results from
Experiment 1, we confirm that the self-touching illusion is a solid
effect.
EXPERIMENT 3
Figures 2E,F show the questionnaire data of the other two full-
body conditions, FB3 and FB4. Figures 2G,H present the ques-
tionnaire data of the two body-part conditions, BP1 and BP2. We
will see that, by combining the data from these and other syn-
chronous conditions, an important lesson can be drawn regarding
the relationship between the sense of body-part ownership and
full-body ownership.
THE SENSE OF BODY OWNERSHIP
One distinct feature of our study is that totally we carried out
six synchronous body-part and full-body conditions, which are
more than previous studies (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Another feature is that we
asked self-touching questions (Q4 and Q5) and full-body ques-
tions (Q6, Q7, and Q8) both in the body-part conditions (BP1
and BP2) and in the full-body conditions (FB1∼FB4). These fea-
tures allow us to compare the participants’ responses in many
different conditions. We hypothesized that the illusory sense of
full-body ownership would gradually increase from the body-part
conditions to the full-body conditions. To test this hypothesis, we
used ANOVA to analyze the questionnaire data on Q5∼Q8 across
the following series of conditions: BP1, BP2, FB3, FB4, and FB1.
The order of this series was determined by the scopes that the par-
ticipants saw via the HMD, which systematically increase from the
body-part to the full-body conditions: BP1 (passive hand only),
BP2 (both passive hand and active hand), FB3 (only torso), FB4
(torso and active hand) and FB1 (torso, active hand and face)
(Figures 1B,D–G). We can see that each condition involves just
one more factor than the one on its left (except for the minimum
full-body condition FB3 compared with BP2) (Table 2). FB2 was
not included in this analysis because the hand seen via the HMD
was not on the same side compared with FB1 and FB4. We chose
Q5∼Q8 because they are all associated with the sense of full-body
ownership, which was also why Q4 was not included. In addition
to the hypothesis just mentioned, we also like to know whether
significant differences will exist only between the two poles (or
near the two poles) of the series, i.e., whether there will be no sig-
nificant differences between any two conditions that appear next
to each other in the series.
We conducted an ANOVA analysis on Q5∼Q8 to see how the
answers varied across conditions. Then we did post-hoc analy-
ses to know how the significances are distributed. Regarding Q5
[p = 0.008, F(4, 136) = 3.625, η2 = 0.096, ANOVA], significant
differences existed between FB1 (mean = 0.974, SD = 1.852) and
BP2 (mean = −0.444, SD = 1.717) (p = 0.020, Tukey-Kramer
test), and between FB1 and FB3 (mean = −0.417, SD = 1.792)
(p = 0.032, Tukey-Kramer test) (Figure 3A). Regarding Q6 [p =
0.001, F(4,136) = 5.044, η2 = 0.129, ANOVA], there are signifi-
cant differences between FB1 (mean = 1.684, SD = 1.378) and
BP1 (mean = −0.240, SD = 1.877) (p < 0.001, Tukey-Kramer
test), and between FB4 (mean = 1.111, SD = 1.695) and BP1
(p = 0.037, Tukey-Kramer test) (Figure 3B). Regarding Q7 [p =
0.009, F(4, 136) = 3.514, η2 = 0.094, ANOVA], significant differ-
ences existed only between FB1 (mean = 1.500, SD = 1.640) and
BP1 (mean = −0.120, SD = 1.986); the p-value of the Tukey-
Kramer test was.008 (Figure 3C). Finally, for Q8 [p = 0.003,
F(4, 136) = 4.219, η2 = 0.110, ANOVA], we observed significant
differences between FB1 (mean = 1.474, SD = 1.428) and BP1
(mean = −0.120, SD = 1.787) (p = 0.004, Tukey-Kramer test),
and between FB4 (mean = 1.519, SD = 1.602) and BP1 (p =
0.006, Tukey-Kramer test) (Figure 3D). These results support our
hypothesis that significant differences are observed only between
the two poles (or near the two poles) of the series, i.e., there are
no significant differences between any two conditions that stand
next to each other in the series (Figure 3E).
We also did a correlation analysis on Q5∼Q8 across the above
five conditions, taking those conditions as a nominal variable X,
and the scores of Q5∼Q8 as a continuous variable Y. We found
that there was a weak positive correlation between the two vari-
ables. Here are the Spearman’s ρ for each of Q5∼Q8: (Q5, ρ =
0.255) (Q6, ρ = 0.342) (Q7, ρ = 0.309) (Q8, ρ = 0.295). Also,
the Spearman’s ρ between the five conditions and the average
of Q5∼Q8 was low as well (ρ = 0.341, Figure 4A). All of the
correlations here are significant (p < 0.01). Again, these results
support our hypotheses that, although the illusory sense of full-
body ownership gradually increases from body-part to full-body
conditions, the differences between the “neighboring conditions”
are not significant.
THE SENSE OF EXPERIENTIAL OWNERSHIP
In this study, two statements were designed precisely to measure
the participants’ sense of experiential ownership: “It was me who
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FIGURE 3 | ANOVA Results for Body Ownership. (A) ANOVA result of
Q5, showing means, SE, and significant relations. The star symbols
represent the significant difference by post-hoc analysis. (B) ANOVA result
of Q6, showing means, SE, and significant relations. The star symbols
represent the significant difference by post-hoc analysis. (C) ANOVA result
of Q7, showing means, SE, and significant relations. The star symbols
represent the significant difference by post-hoc analysis. (D) ANOVA result
of Q8, showing means, SE, and significant relations. The star symbols
represent the significant difference by post-hoc analysis. (E) The whole
picture of comparisons between every two conditions shown by
Tukey-Kramer test result. There were no significant differences between
the “neighboring conditions.”
felt being brushed, not someone else” (Q9), and “The one who
felt being brushed was not me” (Q10). Notice that these two state-
ments are directly opposite to each other. Also, they are not about
the sense of body ownership, but about who felt the tactile sen-
sations caused by brushing. We focused on FB1 and FB2, since
they are supported by SCRmeasurements. That means the results
of FB1 and FB2 revealed the participants’ subjective experiences
rather than just their judgments in the questionnaires. During
the experiments the participants were touched by a paintbrush,
so they were indeed the subjects of those tactile sensations. This
fixed the fact of their experiential ownership. The task was to
examine whether this fact was correctly represented by their sense
of experiential ownership. We found that, in FB1 and FB2, the
average scores on Q9 were 1.58 and 1.04 respectively (Figure 4B).
Also, 32% of the subjects in FB1 answered (−1), (0), or (+1) on
Q9, and 36% did so in FB2. The standard deviation of Q9 in FB1
was 1.50, and in FB2 it was 1.55. As an opposite statement, the
average scores on Q10 in FB1 and FB2 were −1.03 and −0.50
respectively (Figure 4B). While 13.2% of participants in FB1 and
FB2 disagreed with Q9 (i.e., they answered either −1, −2, or −3),
18.4% of them agreed with Q10. Figure 4C indicates that the
negative correlation between these two sets of results is low (coef-
ficient R = −0.3278). Later we will discuss the impact of these
data on IEM and on the sense of experiential ownership.
DISCUSSION
BODY OWNERSHIP
In our experiments, the participants not only received tac-
tile stimulations but also held a paintbrush to touch someone
else’s hand. Thus, agency was clearly involved. Moreover, via
the HMD, the subjects saw their own full body facing them-
selves (Figures 1B–E). This set-up was quite different from that
in Lenggenhager et al. (2007) and Ehrsson (2007) where the par-
ticipants watched their own virtual body from the back. Also,
these previous studies did not involve agency; the participants
only received visual-tactile stimulations either from the back
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007) or in the chest (Ehrsson, 2007). Our
set-up was more similar to one of the body swap experiments by
Petkova and Ehrsson (2008), where the participant and the exper-
imenter faced each other and squeezed each other’s hands (cf.
their Figure 6). Still, our set-up differed from theirs in that we
combined a subject-experimenter interaction with the RHI. This
experimental strategy—incorporating elements of body-part illu-
sions with full-body illusions—has not been used until recently
(Olivé and Berthoz, 2012; van Doorn et al., 2014). We hypothe-
sized that the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-
body ownership are not essentially distinct from each other. This
is supported by the results of our ANOVA post-hoc analyses and
correlation analyses reported above (Figures 3A–E, 4A). Since we
address this issue only at the psychophysical level, we do not claim
that our hypothesis would automatically apply at the neurophys-
iological level. Still, this hypothesis is useful as it can serve as a
research guide or theoretical constraint for enquiries into body
mereology and the relevant neural mechanisms (Petkova et al.,
2011b).
Most RHI studies agree that multisensory stimulations and
integration are important for explaining the illusory sense of body
ownership. According to the bottom-up approach, the RHI is
caused by interactions between vision, touch and propriocep-
tion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2012). In contrast,
the top-down approach suggests that the synchronous multisen-
sory stimulations and integration are necessary but not sufficient
for the RHI (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010, 2011). A
pre-existing representation of body is required to explain various
aspects of the RHI, such as the visual form congruency, anatom-
ical congruency, postural congruency, etc., between the viewed
fake hand and the felt body-part. Tsakiris proposes a model that
explains the RHI in terms of three critical comparisons: “First,
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Correlation and Results of Experiential Ownership.
(A) Correlation between the average of Q5∼Q8 and the condition variable,
showing only a weakly positive correlation (ρ = 0.341). Spearman’s ρ stands
for the correlation coefficient. (B) Result of Q9 and Q10 in FB1 and FB2. Q9:
“It was me who felt being brushed, not someone else.” Q10: “The person
who felt being brushed was not me.” The scores were not predicted by IEM.
The bars represent the mean values of the physiological scale, and the error
bars indicate standard error. (C) indicates that the negative correlation
between the scores of Q9 and Q10 in FB1 and FB2 was low (Pearson’s
R = −0.3278). For details, see the Results section.
a pre-existing stored model of the body distinguishes between
objects that may or may not be part of one’s body. Second, on-line
anatomical and postural representations of the body modulate
the integration of multisensory information that leads to the
recalibration of visual and tactile coordinate systems. Third, the
resulting referral of tactile sensation will give rise to the subjec-
tive experience of body-ownership” (2010, p. 703). Not everyone
agrees that there has to be a fixed body model in order to explain
body ownership (Guterstam et al., 2011). We stay neutral on the
debate between the bottom-up and top-down approaches, and
would just like to mention that both approaches share the view
that the subject’s 1PP is essential for the RHI to be induced.
In contrast, the role of 1PP is more controversial in the
research of full-body ownership. It has been pointed out that two
rather different types of set-up have been used by researchers. As
Petkova et al. (2011a, p. 2) indicate, the virtual body was either
viewed by the subject from the adopted 3PP “as though look-
ing at another individual a couple of meters in front of oneself”
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Aspell et al., 2009), or from the
adopted 1PP “as though directly looking down at one’s body”
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011a; van der Hoort
et al., 2011). An issue then arises concerning which set-up is more
appropriate. Petkova et al. (2011a) suggested that viewing the vir-
tual body from the subject’s (adopted) visual 1PP is absolutely
crucial for full-body illusions to be induced. They made the fol-
lowing criticism of the 3PP set-up used by Lenggenhager et al.
(2007): since the virtual body was seen from 3PP and the situa-
tion is more like recognizing oneself on a surveillance monitor,
what happened to the participants could be just a visual self-
recognition “without necessarily experiencing a somatic illusion
of ownership in the same way as in the rubber hand illusion or
in the body-swap illusion” (Petkova et al., 2011a, p. 5). That is, it
is possible that the participants in Lenggenhager et al. (2007) did
not really experience a genuine full-body illusion.
In our full-body conditions, the virtual body was also viewed
from the adopted 3PP. But we think that the criticism by Petkova
et al. (2011a) can be replied to by two aspects of our experiments.
First, the questionnaires in FB1 and FB2 were supported by the
SCR measurements in Experiments 1 and 2, where a kitchen
knife approached the subject’s (adopted) visual 1PP. Although the
threat was not applied to the virtual body, the SCR data collabo-
rate well with the second aspect: we included statements about
the self-touching illusion (Q4, Q5) and the double-body effect
(Q12, Q13). As reported above, both the SCR and questionnaires
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show that significant differences exist between the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions. Together, these data indicate that
the participants in FB1 and FB2 experienced not only the illu-
sory sense that they were brushing themselves, but also that they
had two bodies. This goes beyond mere visual self-recognition
and suggests that the relevant full-body illusions were genuinely
induced.
In addition to tactile sensations, proprioception and visual
1PP, we think that there are two more factors which come into
play: “visual form congruency” and “visual agency.” As we go
back to consider the data revealed in Figures 3A–D, we will see
that these two factors often have greater influences on the sense of
body ownership than the subject’s visual 1PP.
Visual form congruency
In our full-body conditions, the participants watched their body
facing themselves. In such cases, visual form congruency refers
to the scope of what the subject saw via the HMD. The scope
of HMD images enlarges gradually and systematically from FB3,
FB4 to FB1, which positively correlates with the strength of the
relevant full-body illusions (Figures 3A–D). Although the vir-
tual body was always presented from the adopted 3PP, this, as
we have just argued above, would not necessarily hinder the rele-
vant full-body illusions. In our body-part conditions, visual form
congruency concerns whether the hand or hands that the par-
ticipants saw via the HMD looked like their own. According to
the first comparison in Tsakiris’ model of body ownership, “the
more the viewed object matches the structural appearance of the
body-part’s form, the stronger the experience of body-ownership
will be” (2010, p. 707). We agree. Seeing one’s own hand via a
HMD satisfies both visual form congruency and Tsakiris’ first
comparison. However, as will be discussed later, our data may
challenge the second comparison of Tsakiris’ model, which con-
cerns postural congruency. According to this comparison, “If
there is incongruency between the posture of felt and seen hands,
the seen hand will not be experienced as part of one’s own body”
(2010, p. 708). In our experiments, when the subject saw the
experimenter’s hand via a HMD, it was always presented from
the subject’s adopted 1PP. On the other hand, when the sub-
ject saw his/her own hand, it was always presented from the
subject’s adopted 3PP. We will soon consider whether postural
incongruency can be remedied or outweighed by visual form
congruency.
Visual agency
We suggest distinguishing between “body agency” and “visual
agency.” Body agency refers to the subject feeling his/her own
act of brushing via proprioception. It has been shown that body
agency can either diminish or facilitate the RHI (Tsakiris et al.,
2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). What we would like to add is
that agency can play a role in bodily self-consciousness, not only
by being felt but also by being seen. Visual agency refers to the
brushing activity that the participants saw through the HMD. We
further suggest distinguishing between “1PP visual agency” and
“3PP visual agency.” 1PP visual agency refers to the participants
seeing the act of brushing by the experimenter’s hand from the
adopted 1PP, while 3PP visual agency refers to the participants
seeing the act of brushing by their own hand from the adopted
3PP.
These two factors—visual form congruency and visual
agency—can help explain the sense of body ownership involved
in our experiments. Consider the series of conditions that we ana-
lyzed in the Result section: BP1, BP2, FB3, FB4, and FB1. These
conditions involved the same tactile sensations, proprioception
and body agency. What distinguished between them were visual
form congruency and 3PP visual agency. Both the ANOVA and
correlation analyses on Q6∼Q8 showed that the illusory sense of
full-body ownership gradually increased from the minimal body-
part condition BP1 to the maximum full-body condition FB1
(Figures 3B–D). This can be nicely explained by the following
comparisons: (1) compared with BP1, BP2 involves 3PP visual
agency as an extra factor; (2) FB3 lacks 3PP visual agency but
has a stronger visual form congruency than BP2; (3) FB4 con-
tains not only 3PP visual agency but also a stronger visual form
congruency than FB3; and (4) compared with FB4, FB1 involves
an even stronger visual form congruency, i.e., seeing the subject’s
own face. As mentioned above, Q5 is about self-identification,
and the scores across conditions seem to form a low-group
(BP1, BP2, FB3) and a high-group (FB4, FB1) (Figure 3A). We
suspect that this indicates that both 3PP visual agency and a
strong visual form congruency are required for an illusory sense
of self-identification. Notice that, even so, there are no signif-
icant differences between neighboring conditions in the series
(Figure 3A). Finally, FB4 and FB1 have almost the same scores on
Q8 (Figure 3D). We think this is because the factor of 3PP visual
agency was the same in these two conditions. Since Q8 is about
full-body agency, it is expected that 3PP visual agency would be
more important than visual form congruency.
To conclude this part of the discussion, we have suggested
that (1) visual form congruency can sometimes outweigh postu-
ral incongruency, which implies that the second comparison in
Tsakiris’ model can sometimes be violated. When there is strong
visual form congruency, full-body illusions can still be induced
in the face of postural incongruency; and (2) the distinction
between body agency and visual agency, and the further distinc-
tion between 1PP visual agency and 3PP visual agency can help
explain how body-part and full-body illusions may be hindered
or facilitated.
EXPERIENTIAL OWNERSHIP
As mentioned above, the current mainstream view of the sense
of experiential ownership is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein
(1958) and Shoemaker’s IEM (1968). Recall that IEM is the
thesis that when I am aware of a phenomenal state through first-
personal access I cannot be wrong about whether it is I who feels it.
As mentioned in the Introduction, most of its defenders consider
it as a conceptual truth based on language use. There are, there-
fore, very few empirical discussions on IEM and on the sense of
experiential ownership (Legrand, 2007; Gallagher, 2012).
One of few exceptions was by Mizumoto and Ishikawa (2005)
where the authors used a full-body illusion to argue against IEM.
However, the authors described that “the subject . . . unanimously
(all four subjects who participated in this particular experiment)
reported that he ‘felt’ as if the body he was watching was his,
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although he in fact knew that it was not” (2005, p. 8). They also
remarked that “What we have shown is the possibility, not the
necessity, of the subject’s mistakenly reacting to the attack to the
other’s body, which confirms our hypothesis that they felt as if
they were there being tapped in the visual frame, while in fact
they were not” (2005, p. 9, the authors’ italics). The problem is:
in our terms, they characterized their version of full-body illu-
sion as concerning the sense of full-body ownership (and touch
referral) rather than the sense of experiential ownership. As men-
tioned in the Introduction, IEM is about the latter, not the former.
The difference between the two was nicely illustrated by two
patients described by Moro et al. (2004) who denied ownership
of their left hand, in which they had no sensation, and lost their
left visual field. When their left hand was moved to the right so
that they could see it, they became capable of detecting tactile
sensations. But despite representing themselves as the ones who
felt the sensations, the two patients still denied the ownership of
their left hands. This shows that it is possible to have the sense of
experiential ownership without the sense of body ownership.
Here, we discuss an interdisciplinary approach that defends
IEM based on the phenomenological structure of experience that
we call the Pre-reflective Account (Gallagher, 2005, 2012; Zahavi,
2005; Legrand, 2006, 2007, 2010). According to this account, the
sense of self-as-subject is not achieved through introspection,
judgment or attention. At the pre-reflective level, the sense of self-
as-subject is a constitutive component of conscious state rather
than an intentional object of consciousness. This makes the sense
of self-as-subject identification-free, i.e., it does not involve iden-
tification of self as the subject, and hence enjoys IEM (Legrand,
2007; Gallagher, 2012). When I am pre-reflectively conscious of
myself-as-subject, I cannot be wrong about whether I am the sub-
ject of experiences. We will call this view pre-reflective immunity.
Like Shoemaker’s version of IEM, pre-reflective immunity asserts
a very strong modal claim. It states that violation of IEM is not
possible.
Now, based on our data reported in the Results section, we
argue that the sense of self-as-subject does not enjoy IEM, i.e.,
violation of IEM is possible. It is possible for misrepresentation to
occur in one’s pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership. If so,
pre-reflective immunity does not hold. Below we show that the
data of our experiments do not lend any support to Shoemaker’s
IEM at all. The best interpretation suggests that misrepresenta-
tion can occur in one’s sense of experiential ownership. Then
we respond to a possible objection to our position from the
standpoint of the Pre-reflective Account.
Part of the reason why this is a knotty issue concerns how the
participants understood Q9 and Q10. For the sake of argument,
we will consider different possibilities: (I) Suppose the partic-
ipants understood Q9 as addressing themselves. That is, from
their subjective point of view: it was me who felt the brushing.
Then, according to IEM, no participants would commit mistakes
regarding their sense of experiential ownership. One would expect
that most participants would answer “strongly agree” (+3) or at
least “agree” (+2) on Q9. But that is not the case. 13.2% of par-
ticipants in FB1 and FB2 disagreed with Q9 (i.e., they answered
either −1, −2, or −3). The average scores of Q9 were much lower
than this interpretation requires (Figure 4B). (II) Suppose for
some reason that the participants understood Q9 as addressing
someone else. That is, on their subjective experiences: it was not
me who felt the brushing. Then, according to IEM, one would
expect that most participants would answer “strongly disagree”
(−3) or at least “disagree” (−2) on Q9. But this is not the case,
either. This time, the average scores of Q9 are too high to fit
this interpretation (Figure 4B). (III) Suppose that the partici-
pants did not all understand Q9 in the same way; some took it
as addressing themselves, but others as addressing someone else.
Then, assuming IEM holds, one would expect the participants to
answer either +3 (or at least +2) or −3 (or at least −2). But,
again, that is not the case. As reported in the Results section, many
participants answered “slightly disagree” (−1), “not sure” (0),
or “slightly agree” (+1). In fact, the standard deviation in each
experiment is large (FB1 SD = 1.50, FB2 SD = 1.55), suggesting
that the participants’ responses to Q9 varied widely.
The point here is that none of the above interpretations can
support IEM. Based on the data, it is more plausible that at
least some participants in these experiments were uncertain about
whether they were the subjects of the tactile sensations that they
actually felt. This uncertainty could very well take place at the pre-
reflective level. That is, the fact of receiving tactile sensations does
not guarantee that the participants will necessarily have the sense
that “I am the one who felt them.” There is no empirical evidence
against our position here, and that our interpretation can better
accommodate why the participants did not respond to Q9 in the
way that conforms to IEM. The data provide empirical evidence
for the possibility that one’s sense of experiential ownership can
misrepresent the relevant fact of experiential ownership. Hence,
IEM could potentially be falsified.
The defender of pre-reflective immunity would probably reject
all the above interpretations and argue that our data can be
explained in a way that does not jeopardize IEM. It might be that,
due to the unusual experience of the self-touching illusion, not
only did different participants understand Q9 (“It was me who
felt being brushed, not someone else”) differently, but also many
of them were unsure about how to respond to it. The defense
is that, no matter what answers the participants gave on Q9, it
remains that they were the actual subjects of the tactile sensations
that they felt. The variety of their answers only reveals the uncer-
tainty of their judgments, not the uncertainty of their sense of
experiential ownership or what Gallagher (2012) calls their pre-
reflective 1PP. Even if some of their judgments were wrong, the
mistakes were at the reflective level, not at the pre-reflective level.
Here are our responses. First, it is one thing that the par-
ticipants have a pre-reflective 1PP; it is another whether they
might be mistaken about that perspective. Having a pre-reflective
1PP only secures the fact of the participants’ experiential owner-
ship. It should not be taken for granted that this fact cannot be
misrepresented by their pre-reflective sense of experiential owner-
ship. Second, all the participants in our experiments were healthy
subjects. There are no compelling reasons why their judgments
cannot reveal their pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership.
Even if they were uncertain about whom Q9 was addressing and
hence were less confident about the judgments they made, this
could well be an indication that at the pre-reflective level they
were unsure (and hence prone to error) about who the subject
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of the sensations was. Finally, in addition to Q9, we also pre-
sented Q10 (“The one who felt being brushed was not me”) in the
questionnaires. The direct contrast between Q10 and Q9 was so
obvious that, even if the participants felt uncertain about Q9, the
contrast can still be easily recognized. So, if IEM holds, one can
reasonably expect that the participants’ responses would man-
ifest a strong “negative correlation” between Q9 and Q10. For
example, if a subject answers +3 to Q9, then he/she would likely
answer −3 (or at least −2) to Q10, etc. However, the data show
no such correlation (Figure 4C).
The simple and best explanation of the data, we suggest, is that
at least some of the participants were unsure or mistaken about
who the subject was—even at the pre-reflective level. We can agree
that (1) For every tactile sensation there must be a subject who
experiences it; (2) Every tactile sensation is necessarily experi-
enced from the subject’s 1PP; and (3) Every tactile sensation is
experienced by the one who has the 1PP of that state. However,
(1)∼(3) together do not imply (4): Every tactile sensation is rep-
resented from the first-person point of view as experienced by the
one who has the 1PP of that state. The key is that (3) and (4) are
not equivalent: feeling tactile sensations is one thing, but whether
one experiences oneself as the subject of those sensations could be
another. It is empirically possible that (4) was not obeyed in FB1
and FB2. This shows that violation of IEM is indeed possible.
Another possible defense of pre-reflective immunity appeals to
recent studies on the second-person perspective (2PP) and social
cognition (Fuchs, 2013; Froese et al., 2014). Since the experimen-
tal set-ups in FB1 and FB2 involved two people brushing each
other, perhaps the brushing experience was a social one. A bet-
ter description of the participant’s experience would be: “It was
we who felt being brushed by each other.” This can accommodate
why some participants disagreed with Q9: although they agreed
that “It was me who felt being brushed,” they disagreed with the
latter part of Q9 “not someone else,” since there was indeed some-
one else, i.e., the experimenter, who felt being brushed as well.
Thus, our data can be explained by the involvement of the partici-
pants’ 2PP rather than by misrepresentation of their pre-reflective
sense of experiential ownership.
Since we focused on the mainstream view about the sense
of self-as-subject and IEM, our questionnaires did not take the
second-person perspective (2PP) into account. We agree that,
in future studies, it would be interesting to add 2PP state-
ments into the questionnaires to see how the subjects respond to
them. Having said this, we will make the following remarks in
our defense. First, suppose some participants disagreed with Q9
because of the 2PP considerations, this does not mean we can be
certain that all of those who did so were due to the same rea-
sons. Since we argue only that IEM could potentially be falsified,
this stance seems to remain intact. Second, suppose some partici-
pants’ sense of experiential ownership involved a 2PP as well as a
pre-reflective 1PP, and suppose that their rejection of (or uncer-
tainty about) Q9 can be explained by the 2PP interpretation. Can
we be sure that therefore their pre-reflective sense of experien-
tial ownership was necessarily correct? Given our experiments and
argument, it would require more evidence for the 2PP account to
really save pre-reflective immunity from our attack. Finally, our
study shows that sometimes it does make sense to ask “are you
sure it is you who feel the sensations?” We think that introduc-
ing the social question “It was we who felt being brushed by each
other” into the investigation will make it even more significant to
pursue the Wittgenstein-style questions.
To conclude this part of the discussion, we have proposed a
simple account three paragraphs above—(1)∼(3) do not imply
(4)—that challenges the mainstream view about the sense of
experiential ownership. According to this account, the fact of
experiential ownership can be misrepresented by the subject’s
pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership. Therefore, we
believe that the current best evidence undercuts the empirical
basis of pre-reflective immunity.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that the sense of body ownership and the
sense of experiential ownership are different types of bodily self-
consciousness. Regarding the former, we have proposed that (1)
the self-touching illusion is a solid effect; and (2) there is no
fundamental difference between the sense of body-part owner-
ship and the sense of full-body ownership. Regarding the sense
of experiential ownership, we have argued that (1) the fact
of experiential ownership can be misrepresented by the sub-
ject’s pre-reflective sense of experiential ownership; and (2) both
Wittgenstein and Shoemaker could very well be wrong: some-
times it makes sense to ask the Wittgenstein-style questions (Q9
and Q10); it is probable that IEM as well as pre-reflective immu-
nity fail to hold. Our study has a positive implication: not only
the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experien-
tial ownership allows and calls for interdisciplinary studies. Two
important issues require further investigation. First, what is the
relationship between the sense of body ownership and the sense
of experiential ownership? Our current thought is that the former
presupposes the latter. The idea is that when a participant experi-
ences a body-part or a whole body as his/her own, it is relevant
to consider whether the participant also represents him/herself
as the subject of this experience of body ownership. Hence we
hypothesize that the sense of experiential ownership is a constitu-
tive component of the sense of body ownership. Further inquiries
will be required to test this hypothesis. Second, what are the
neural mechanisms that underlie these two types of bodily self-
consciousness?Many works have been done regarding the sense of
body ownership (Tsakiris, 2010; Ionta et al., 2011; Blanke, 2012;
Ehrsson, 2012; Serino et al., 2013). In contrast, we currently know
very little about the neural basis of the sense of experiential own-
ership (Christoff et al., 2011). We believe that the self-touching
paradigm and the Wittgenstein-style questions that we developed
can contribute to the future research on this issue.
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